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§@ªÌ/Robert L. Chard |
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Signs of organized military activity at the local level can also be found. The Shiji “Annals of Xiang Yu¡¨ record Xiang Liang’s ¶µ±ç preparations for rebellion in the Wu region under Qin rule, saying that he exploited occasions such as funeral processions and corvée musterings to drill large numbers of people in military maneuvers. Fragments of the lost Chu Han chunqiu ·¡º~¬K¬î record that Xiang Liang’s men were also melting down coins to make weapons. More generally, the periodic occurrence of armed religious rebellions from Eastern Han times onward, and rapid militarization at local and regional level during times of disorder, might suggest widespread martial training and some form of military organization at grass-roots level, a subsoil from which larger armies might sprout. For example, the Yellow Turbans of the late Han were able to amass enormous forces over a wide area within a relatively short space of time. Of course grass-roots martial training and organization was to a considerable extent initiated officially, through conscription and garrisons under the control of the local administration, but we do know that from Eastern Han times onward powerful families used armed dependants to defend their estates, and it is possible that local communities would have formed militias in the same way as they did in the Song dynasty and later. Certainly at the county level and higher regional armies and warlords inevitably appeared during times of disorder, but only those powerful enough to participate on the national stage were ever mentioned in the official histories. For example, the Sanguo zhi ¤T°ê§Ó records that in AD 194 Lu Bu §f¥¬ was defeated at Chengzhi ¼¤ó by one Li Jin §õ¶i, identified only as “a man of the county¡¨ (xianren ¿¤¤H), and not found anywhere else. He appears only because he fought off Lu Bu, a major player; there must have been many others like him at the county level and below. It is in sources of the Song period and later, particularly in unofficial histories (yeshi ³¥¥v) and biji µ§°O collections that the full extent of local militarism become apparent. For this I rely on the discussion in Chen Shan ³¯¤s, Zhongguo wuxia shi ¤¤°êªZ«L¥v. Chen argues for a widespread popularization of the wuxia tradition and the practice of martial arts from the Song dynasty onward, though I would suggest that this might in part be a function of the much more detailed records available in late imperial times, more an evolution of the grass-roots militarism which had existed throughout Chinese history than something entirely new. However, there is no question but that the Song and later sources reveal a world strikingly similar to that depicted in traditional and modern wuxia fiction. ¡@ |
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